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Abstract
Although I have provided direct services and engaged in litigation 
related to municipal fines & fees in New York City, monetary sanctions 
are not my area of legal expertise.  Bearing that in mind, I am offer-
ing these thoughts in my capacity as a scholar of law, race, and money, 
and more importantly, as an organizer for economic justice.  I hope the 
essay facilitates constructive conversations about the frameworks we use 
to analyze the political economy of monetary sanctions and mass incar-
ceration.  I am grateful to the UCLA Criminal Justice Law Review and 
the organizers of “Progressing Reform of Fees and Fines: Towards A Re-
search and Policy Agenda Conference”, hosted at Harvard Law School, 
for the opportunity to share these reflections.
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Introduction
Although it may have been a conservative British politician, Mar-
garet Thatcher, who epitomized the cynicism of taxpayer politics by 
declaring, “there is no such thing as public money, only taxpayer money,” 
appealing to taxpayers as fiscal benefactors is now axiomatic in U.S. pol-
itics.1  Politicians and advocates across the political spectrum are quick 
to label unfavored spending as a waste of “taxpayer money”, rather than 
“government money” or “public money”, despite the myriad ways in 
which governments fund themselves.  Today, scholars and activists are 
increasingly challenging this dynamic, interrogating both the underlying 
technical analysis and the tendency of the framework to subvert progres-
sive (to say nothing of radical) political projects.
This reflection adopts the spirit of that challenge in discussing 
“monetary sanctions”—obligations to local governments or their agen-
cies arising from the carceral system, including criminal fines, court fees, 
and restitution.2  Thanks to the tireless work of many practitioners, ac-
tivists, and scholars, it is now well documented that monetary sanctions 
unjustly punish the poor and discriminate against people of color and 
other minorities.3  As such, illustrating how monetary sanctions are actu-
ally inefficient at collecting revenue compared to more traditional taxes 
can spur local governments to reexamine their oppressive practices, as 
we have already seen.4
However, simply asserting that taxes should fund courts and law 
enforcement bodies because all “taxpayers” are “served by the justice 
system” elides the deeper politics at play.5  Indeed, monetary sanctions 
are popular precisely because local (white, middle class) taxpayers across 
the country have rejected that very narrative.  More importantly, such 
assertions tend to lead to appeals keyed to interests ostensibly shared by 
all taxpayers, which are truthfully shared only by some taxpayers.
Accordingly, this reflection questions whether it is strategic or even 
coherent to challenge carceral practices, including monetary sanctions, 
1. See, e.g., Mareva Lindo, Taxes, Breached Podcast (May 23, 2018), https://
www.breachedpodcast.org/breached-podcast/2018/5/22/taxes [https://perma.cc/
3ZLP-739N].
2. Also known as legal financial obligations (LFOs), monetary sanctions include 
criminal fines, court fees, and restitution.  Claire Greenberg et al., The Growing 
and Broad Nature of Legal Financial Obligations: Evidence from Alabama Court 
Records, 48 Conn. L. Rev. 1079, 1081 (2016).
3. See e.g. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to 
Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841, 879 (2017).
4. Andrew Weber, Study Prompts ‘Deeper Dive’ Into Court Debt, Fines Levied On 
Poor Defendants In Travis County, Kut (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.kut.org/post/
study-prompts-deeper-dive-court-debt-fines-levied-poor-defendants-travis-
county [https://perma.cc/6MT3-HK7Q].
5. Lauren Brooke-Eisen & Matthew Menendez,  The Steep Costs of Criminal Jus-
tice Fees and Fines, Brennan Center for Justice (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-
and-fines [https://perma.cc/7SXZ-8DVK].
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by identifying “taxpayers” as a cohesive political entity and appealing to 
their pocketbooks.6  In doing so, it first summarizes insights regarding the 
racialization of taxpayer politics, then explores an alternative framework 
for understanding the law and political economy of monetary sanctions, 
and finally underscores the need to integrate such insights into the na-
tional movement against monetary sanctions.
I. Racialized Taxation & Social Control
At the heart of the surveillance of “taxpayer money” and appeals to 
“taxpayers” as a whole lies a fundamental misconception: a premise that 
“taxpayers” are solidaristic, cohesive, or at least politically aligned with 
each other per se.  This obscures important socioeconomic differences 
between taxpayers that often matter more than the mere fact that they 
pay taxes.  In particular, critical tax scholars have long noted that due to 
the politics of race and class, low-income taxpayers, who are dispropor-
tionately racial and ethnic minorities7, are simply not treated as peers by 
other taxpayers.  Rather, they are considered the “undeserving poor”, sep-
arate from the middle class, and politically unpopular.8  Most taxpayers of 
color—and most taxpayers in general—have simply not benefited from 
the bipartisan barrage of special breaks, loopholes, and deductions and 
are generally disadvantaged by efforts that claim to protect them.9  Very 
little, if any, empirical work suggests that a group as large and unwieldy as 
“taxpayers” function as an integrated, multiracial political unit.  As such, 
it seems prudent not to treat taxpayers as a monolith that might share 
opinions about financing a criminal legal system that “serves” individual 
taxpayers and groups of taxpayers quite differently.
In “Racial Taxation: Schools, Segregation, and Taxpayer Citizen-
ship, 1869–1973,” (Racial Taxation) Camille Walsh problematizes the use 
of “taxpayer identity” in arguably the most thorough manner to date.  In 
doing so, Walsh argues that “the claim of ‘tax-payer’ almost always has 
a hidden symbolic meaning premised in whiteness and has served as a 
currency of exclusion and inequality . . . ” (emphasis added).10  Although 
6. See, e.g., Christian Henrichson, Joshua Rinaldi, & Ruth Delaney, The Price of 
Jails: Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration, Vera Institute of Jus-
tice (May 2015), http://www.vera.org/publications/the-price-of-jails- measuring-
the-taxpayer-cost-of-local-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5X2S-P8VN].
7. Leo P. Martinez, Latinos and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Primer for 
the New Administration, 20 Harv. Latinx L. Rev. 101, 108 (2017); Francine J. Lip-
man, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and With-
out Representation, 9 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that undocument-
ed immigrants pay billions each year in excise, property, and payroll taxes, and 
that hundreds of thousands more file state and federal tax returns).
8. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 
790, 810 (2007).
9. Dorothy A. Brown, The 535 Report: A Pathway to Fundamental Tax Reform, 40 
Pepp. L. Rev. 1155, 1172 (2013).
10. Camille Walsh, Racial Taxation: Schools, Segregation, and Taxpayer Citi-
zenship, 1869–1973 4 (2018).
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Walsh supports her claims by revisiting the civil rights struggle for equi-
table public schooling, her work is plainly just as relevant for scholars, 
advocates, and activists fighting for rights against the carceral system and 
its appendages.
In particular, Racial Taxation illustrates how taxpayer politics can 
undermine political and legal struggles for social justice.  As readers may 
recall, cases like Westminster v. Mendez11 and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion may have formally desegregated public schools in the United States, 
but they did not establish a more fundamental federal right to education.12 
Walsh argues that this failure stemmed partially from the reluctance of 
Supreme Court Justices to think about identity and the economics of 
structural inequality simultaneously.13  In any case, the question of a 
fundamental right was not presented to the court until San Antonio v. Ro-
driguez14 in 1973, when Mexican & Chicano parents and students decided 
to challenge the constitutionality of property-tax school financing laws in 
Texas.  Walsh argues that in that crucial case, the Court’s most important 
considerations were hidden in shadows; to borrow the words of another 
Texas policymaker, President Lyndon B. Johnson, they were primarily 
concerned with the rights of taxpayers vs. “taxeaters”.15  Indeed, the cor-
respondence between the Justices, and other historical records, indicate 
that the Justices envisioned taxpayers as isolated benefactors of the state, 
entitled to shares of resources, but not required to share resources.16  It is 
not an overstatement to say that the fight for fundamental federal right 
to education was halted by the “taxpayer citizenship” trope—the idea 
that  taxpayers have greater rights in relation to government than people 
who do not pay taxes.17
Importantly, “taxpayer rights” were not even a legal issue in the 
case.  As Walsh notes, status as a taxpayer is extremely difficult to claim 
as a legal category.  Indeed, since the mid-twentieth century, courts have 
avoided recognizing taxpayers rights and even taxpayer standing pre-
cisely because “taxpayer” is an unwieldy identity, and designation of 
“taxpayers” as a group is bound to be both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive.18  And yet, the rhetoric surrounding legal and political struggles for 
more funding for marginalized communities has always been replete with 
a defense of “taxpayer rights.”
11. Westminster v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).  For extensive discussion of 
this case and its role in the fight for education rights, see generally Ian Haney-
López, Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice (2003).
12. Ian Haney-López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race, 113 
(1996).
13. Walsh, supra note 10, at 79–80.
14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
15. Walsh, supra note 10, at 103.
16. Id. at 79–80.
17. Beverly Moran, Setting an Agenda for the Study of Tax and Black Culture, 21 U. 
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 779, 785 (1999).
18. Walsh, supra note 10, at 6.
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While it is certainly true that there have been and are instances in 
which the rallying cry of “taxpayer rights” or “taxpayer money”  has led 
to justice for the marginalized and oppressed,  a review of recent Ameri-
can history would suggests registering one’s claims to shared resources in 
the key of a “taxpayer” rather than simply a “citizen”, “resident”, or simply 
“human” has not led to democratic outcomes, especially following the 
period of school integration on which Walsh focuses.19  Some scholars 
have even identified the rise of racialized “taxpayer identity” narrative as 
a fundamental feature of neoliberalism’s development:
The tax revolt in California, and the subsequent national antitax 
movement, rode forward on the racial codings embedded in the eco-
nomics and spatial distribution of property ownership.  Suburban 
taxpayer citizens imagined themselves in direct competition with 
city welfare recipients for government services, a competition co-
vertly conceived as a zero sum battle of white neighborhoods versus 
black and Latino housing projects.20
Similarly, the “Make America Great Again” movement—faux pop-
ulism that suggested the great majority rely on the wealthy, rather than 
vice-versa—made astute use of racially coded taxpayer identity.  Anyone 
who followed the 2016 political election knows to whom the laments of 
taxpayers getting their bang for their buck was speaking.
Walsh herself provides a perfect illustration of this phenomenon in 
the introduction to her book.21  During the 2016 election, a map showing 
only white voters began to circulate on white nationalist websites support-
ing Trump under the headline “What if Only Taxpayers Voted?”  After 
claiming falsely that “90%” of taxpayers are white, the white suprema-
cist Daily Pepe website championed a “poll tax” that would deny people 
without net-positive contributions to the fisc of their constitutional right 
to vote.  Despite its popularity in certain circles, this was, by no means, an 
“alt-right” position nor a stance confined to rural Trump-voting counties. 
In the spirit of comity, many liberals have taken to casting entire “red 
states” as tax evaders unfit to remain in the union.22  Wealthy celebrities 
19. “Many cases brought by African American activists and families from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries highlight the double taxation struc-
tures African Americans were subject to in mandatory segregation states, wheth-
er what I call separate taxation or ‘color-blind’ taxation.  This claim to taxpayer 
identity continued in the NAACP cases pressing for equal graduate school ed-
ucation from the 1930s until Brown, and then returned to the court and the po-
litical sphere through the rhetoric of segregationists after Brown.”  Walsh, supra 
note 10, at 5.
20. Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality?: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, 
and the Attack on Democracy 38 (2003).
21. Id at 2.
22. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Are red low-tax states subsidizing blue high-tax states 
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have suggested that voting rights should be conditioned on tax contribu-
tions, in what is arguably a violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.23
The politics of monetary sanctions are not immune to these tropes. 
Indeed, they are mutually constitutive in various ways.  For instance, 
“fines” are often cleaved from the broader category of nonreciprocal ob-
ligations imposed by the states and imbued with social stigma.  Suffice it 
to say that in the United States, “fine payers” do not have the same cul-
tural cache as “taxpayers”, no matter how much the fines resemble taxes.
Although people across the political spectrum appear to be troubled 
by monetary sanctions and the racial wealth extraction they necessarily 
entail, when it comes to the fiscal politics underlying the problem, dif-
ferent political camps clearly hold differing opinions.  On the one hand, 
many conservatives (and some liberals) have historically argued that 
law-abiding taxpayers should be forced to pay for the punishment of of-
fenders.  Liberals respond to this sort of criticism by reflexively pointing 
out that most people who are jailed and imprisoned for fines and fees are 
indeed taxpayers as well as productive members of society and so, they 
should not pay for their own punishment any more than the collective 
should—reasoning that circles right back to the original confrontation 
with conservatives.  Some progressives simply argue the practice of mis-
demeanor-driven incarceration should simply end, but do not suggest any 
funding source for local governments beyond “taxpayers.”
As far as this author can tell, very few, if any groups are pushing 
back against the idea that taxpayer politics is an effective context with-
in which to have this discussion at all.  But I would humbly argue this 
is necessary if we are to truly challenge an “offender-funded justice” 
model.  According to historian Donna Murch, this user-fee incarceration 
model originated after the Los Angeles rebellion in 1992—in which law 
enforcement arrested more than eleven thousand people—stretching 
the capacity of the world’s largest urban jail system.24  Sentinel, a pri-
vate company that partners with carceral complexes around the world, 
proposed that the Los Angeles probation department should require re-
entering offenders to wear its monitoring system—and pay for it.  Above 
all, Sentinel’s model promised savings . . . for taxpayers.
Given the origins of the user-based model, it seems that it will be 
difficult to confront it without challenging the very premises on which it 
rests—that certain people who strongly identify as “taxpayers” must be 
satiated for any real reform to occur.  And yet, in today’s movements for 
criminal justice, we see a strong urge to ally with conservative and liber-
tarian forces on precisely these grounds.  Above all, there is a bipartisan 
23. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Tom Perkins Has a Fascinating, Radical, Un-Amer-
ican Voting Plan, The Atlantic, (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/02/tom-perkins-has-a-fascinating-radical-un- american-
voting-plan/283846.
24. Donna Murch, Paying for Punishment: The New Debtors’ Prison, Bos. Rev. 
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://bostonreview.net/editors-picks-us/donna-murch-paying- 
punishment.
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effort to decarcerate as a cost cutting mechanism meant to appease local 
governments taxpayers.  Murch identifies this as a trap.  Not only do such 
alliances buy into the framework of fiscal austerity used to gut social ser-
vices, but they invite additional predators into the carceral system.
In the regulatory world, there is something called the Bootleg-
ger-Baptist strategy, so called because the “Baptists” decry public laws in 
order to make room for “bootleggers” to profit off their amendment.25  In 
the context of incarceration and monetary sanctions, actors like the Koch 
Brothers and Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) decry the imprudence and 
wastefulness of the carceral system.  But they do this precisely because 
austerity makes room for privatization, for the business activities of Sen-
tinel, CCA, J-Pay, and various forces from the finance, insurance, and real 
estate sectors.  For example, after successfully campaigning for the New 
Mexico governorship as a champion of civil liberties, future Libertarian 
presidential candidate Gary Johnson simply transitioned to housing 44 
percent of inmates in private facilities in just eight years.26
A deeper understanding of the legal design of the monetary system, 
including monetary sanctions, can assist in crafting an explicitly anti-aus-
terian framework that does not play on the racialized tropes that helped 
create monetary sanctions in the first place.  After all, the fact that mu-
nicipalities that rely heavily on revenue from fees and fines have a higher 
than average share of African American and Latino residents is not an 
accident.  For instance, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission notes that the 
impetus behind imposing surcharges on fines in New York State was pre-
cisely to “shift costs of providing services to victims of crime from law 
abiding taxpayers and toward those who commit crimes.”27  In Illinois, 
the imposition of fines and fees was seen as one way to “protect taxpayers 
from over eager local authorities.”28  Across the country, we have seen 
this pattern repeat itself.
II. Toward a New Law & Political Economy Analysis of Monetary 
Sanctions
The pattern repeats because no one has changed the rules.  Re-
cently, a widespread movement within the social sciences and the legal 
academy has attempted to recapture a vision of money and thus entire 
monetary systems, and monetary sanctions, as “an institutionalized social 
25. Frank Pasquale, Bootleggers and Baptists in the Student Loan Debate, Balki-
nization, (October 25, 2015), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/10/ bootleggers-
and-baptists-in-student.html.
26. Nick Tabor, Gary Johnson’s Hard-Right Record, Jacobin Magazine, (Sep. 6, 
2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/gary-johnson-libertarian- president-
new-mexico-gov ernor-record.
27. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Low- 
Income Communities of Color: Civil Rights and Constitutional Implica-
tions 92 (2017).
28. Id at 189.
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relation”29 that is fundamentally legal in nature.  Until recently, even 
historians have tended to downplay money’s constitutive legal charac-
ter, despite identifying money itself as a central institution of modern 
capitalism.30  Although much of this reformist work has been spurred by 
adherents to an economic school of thought known scholastically as Neo-
chartalism, and colloquially as Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), much 
of it is also attributable to legal scholars
who have arrived at similar insights by different routes.31  Under-
neath the technical economic debates between these thinkers lies a 
common premise, an overlapping vision of the role of law in constituting 
money and finance itself.32  Fundamentally, these bodies of thought help 
illuminate financial hierarchies—so we can better dismantle them around 
the world and weave a monetary analysis in other social justice struggles.
When MMT economist and Bernie Sanders presidential campaign 
advisor Stephanie Kelton continuously repeat “money doesn’t grow on 
rich people” (or taxpayers), she is referencing a legal argument.33  Enti-
ties that are not sovereign currency issuers do not generate money; They 
master a system that routes tradeable legal claims on real resources that 
we collectively produce (i.e. “money”) to themselves.34  Such entities are 
in a much different position of power than the monetary sovereign.  They 
must use the government’s currency to survive35—they are “monetary 
29. L. Randall Wray, Alternative Approaches to Money, 11 Theoretical Inquiries in 
L. 29, 39 (2010) (“The orthodox story of money’s origins is rejected by most se-
rious scholars outside economics as historically inaccurate.”).
30. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Hist. of Econ. Analysis 277 (Elizabeth Schumpeter ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1954) (“Monetary analysis introduces the element of money 
on the very ground floor of our analytic structure and abandons the idea that all 
essential features of our economic life can be represented by a barter-economy 
model.”).
31. For the views of MMT’s fellow travelers are well represented in the “Piercing 
the Monetary Veil” blog series, hosted by the Law & Political Economy Project, 
a joint endeavor between Yale Law School and Columbia Law School; available 
at https://lpeblog.org/category/symposia/piercing-the-monetary-veil.  For a deep 
dive into scholarship concerning monetary design, see Christine Desan, Money 
as a Legal Institution, Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages 
to Bretton Woods (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016); Robert C. Hockett 
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1143 (2017); 
Morgan Ricks, Money As Infrastructure, 2018 Columbia Bus. L. Rev. 757 (2018); 
Michael McLeay et al., Money Creation in the Modern Economy, Bank of Eng. 
Q. Bull. 14 (2014); Rohan Grey, Monetary Resilience, 41 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 
505 (2019).
32. Raúl Carrillo & Rohan Grey, A Memo from MMT’s Legal Department, New 
Economic Perspectives (July 15, 2017), http://neweconomicperspectives.
org/2017/07/memo-mmts-legal-department.html.
33. Zach Carter, Stephanie Kelton Has the Biggest Idea in Washington, The Huff-
ington Post (May 21, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/stephanie-kelt-
on-economy-washington_n_5afee5eae4b0463cdba15121.
34. See Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital, 77–107 (Princeton Univ. 2019).
35. For further elaboration of this point, see Raúl Carrillo, Unemployment Isn’t Nat-
ural, It’s A Creature of Legal Design, 37 L. & Ineq. 128, 130 (2019).
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subjects.”  On the other hand, monetary sovereigns have the power to 
not only issue their own currency, but to float their exchange rates, and 
denominate their debts in their own currency.  Most importantly, they 
have the power to collect taxes, fines, and fees, in their own currency.  Ad-
ditionally, it should be noted that most monetary sovereigns are political 
states, but not all political states are monetary sovereigns.36
From a critical legal perspective, monetary sovereigns can never run 
out of money in the same way they can never run out of property.  This is by 
design.  Courts have consistently held that the U.S. Constitution specifically 
grants Congress the power to coin money and to regulate the value there-
of;37 The Supreme Court has affirmed Congress’s constitutional power to 
place as much money as it wants in everyday people’s hands, through fiat 
currency, through the emission of notes.38  Any further decisions as to how 
money should be distributed by government entities and redeemed from 
users of the currency in forms of taxes, or fines, or fees, is a ‘small-c’ con-
stitutional choice.  Because the federal government has full control over 
the architecture of the monetary system and money as a unit, the concept 
of “taxpayer money” is rendered incoherent, except insofar as it is a term 
to narrowly label funds submitted to governments by individual taxpay-
ers as such.  But the federal government does not need taxpayer funds 
in order to appropriate money.  To the extent it needs to offset spending 
with revenue, it clearly does so via methods beyond taxation.  To a lesser, 
but significant extent, this is also true of municipal and state governments. 
It makes just as much sense to call public money “taxpayer money” as it 
does to call it “bondholder money”, “civil-asset-forfeiture-victim money”, 
“ suspicious-driver money” or “Black-pedestrian money.”
Thus, the taxpayer-money framing is “wrong” from the standpoint 
of legal and operational analysis.  As a simple point of logic, money isn’t 
generated by users of the currency, but  by the sole issuer of the currency. 
We need a fiscal reorientation in order to recognize this as a premise of 
policymaking.
As Christine Desan says, monetary design “can bring people to-
gether or set them at each other’s throats.”39  Creating plasticity around 
36. See, e.g., Megan Specia, The African Currency at the Center of a European Dis-
pute, N.Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/world/ 
africa/africa-cfa-franc-currency.html (Greece, which uses the Euro, has little 
monetary sovereignty.  The European Central Bank ultimately controls money 
in Greece.  Senegal, which uses the CFA Franc, which is controlled by the French 
Treasury, which is also subordinate to the European Central Bank, also lacks sig-
nificant monetary sovereignty.).
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
38. See Nathan Tankus, The Shaky Constitutional Foundations of Antebellum Amer-
ican Money: Bank Charters as Delegations of Power, Money as a Democrat-
ic Medium Conference, Harvard Law School (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=o8k8lLKjL6A.
39. Christine Desan, The Impact and Malleability of Money Design, L. and 
Pol. Econ. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/03/25/the-impact-and- 
malleability-of-money-design.
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monetary systems is the key point of her work.  She claims that giving 
away so much monetary design power to banks is a mistake, but we can 
just as easily say that the monetary relationships between the federal 
government, states, municipalities, and the courts also set the table for 
predation.  In our federal system, state and local government entities do 
not have full power to issue currency.  California has police power, but 
it must also adhere to balanced budget provisions and the discretion to 
issue instruments even bearing resemblance to money is limited by the 
U.S. Constitution.40  It has some legal sovereignty, but little monetary 
sovereignty.
Courts face their own survival constraints—they are confronted 
with their own balance sheet logic.  As even Chief Justice Roberts admit-
ted during the sequestration, courts face particular pressures “because 
virtually all of their core functions are constitutionally and statutorily 
required.”41  If they do not get money from the sovereign, they will get it 
from other monetary subjects.  Like banks, courts have certain privileges. 
Just as a bank can create a debt for you and an asset for someone else, so 
can a court.  The court may hold that asset, that money might go to an-
other government entity or a private corporation.  Unlike banks, though, 
courts can even generate new obligations between you and the state it-
self.  And they can often take advantage of their power to load up their 
own balance sheets, which they do all over the country, as the Harvard 
conference made quite clear.
As this conferenced showed, since the financial crisis, we have seen 
how courts and other municipal bodies have turned to bleeding the poor. 
There’s no accounting for the deep urge to dominate people, especial-
ly certain people.  In our racial capitalist society, poor folks are in the 
carceral system partially because cash-strapped entities cannot fund 
basic operations.  Financial crisis begets austerity, which exacerbates the 
criminalization of poverty.
The poster child of austerian taxpayer identity politics is the same 
municipal entity that fines and fees reformers are so familiar with: Fer-
guson, Missouri.  The Ferguson Report made it crystal clear that the city 
relied upon cops as collectors.42  Even though advocates have taken great 
pains to show that it’s not even clear that some other municipalities are 
actually making any money this way, the driving logic remains.43
It is especially important to keep in mind that places like Ferguson 
were deeply shaped by sinister applications of “taxpayer citizenship” and 
“taxpayer identity.”  As Angela Harris reminds us, the spectrum of “slow 
40. Tankus, supra note 39.
41. Adam Liptak, Budget Cuts Imperil Federal Court System, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/us/politics/budget-cuts- imperil-
court-system-chief-justice-says.html.
42. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Po-
lice Department 4 (2015).
43. ACLU, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prison (2010), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/InForAPenny_web.pdf.
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violence”—the “sprawling system of surveillance, punitive discipline, and 
control that makes the lives of poor people profoundly unfree”—is en-
coded in the deep law of the land.44  And the history of “slow violence” 
is inseparable from the history of racial taxation.45  The Missouri consti-
tution greatly limits the ability of municipalities to collect tax revenue. 
In 1980, Representative Mel Hancock—the founder of a group called 
the Taxpayer Survival Association—amended the state constitution to 
require any increase of local taxes, licenses, or fees to be approved by a 
citywide referendum, with very few exceptions.46  As of April 2015, sales 
taxes accounted for the largest share of Ferguson’s municipal revenues.47 
Next come municipal court fines.  Property taxes ranked below telecom-
munications, natural gas, and electricity usage taxes.
This sort of tax hierarchy suggests that politics attuned to the 
needs of “taxpayers” created the open-air debtors prison that is Fergu-
son, Missouri, in the first place.  As the work of Harris, Walsh, and others 
has shown, there exists no monolithic hoard of taxpayers with shared 
interests.48  Contrary to conventional wisdom, there appears to be little 
evidence that taxpayers think of other taxpayers as “equals” within a 
broader body.  To offer a concrete example: it is difficult to imagine that 
a white small businessman threatened with heightened property taxes 
intuitively finds solidarity with an unemployed Black immigrant Uber 
driver drowning in parking tickets and court fees simply because they 
both pay sales taxes.  The identity category of “taxpayer” is necessarily 
stratified and too expansive to serve as the base of a democratic, account-
able political movement.
As of the writing of this essay, Ferguson still burns, in more ways 
than one.  By comparison we do not have the white president’s tax re-
turns, despite bipartisan demands since day one.  The idea that we will 
gain further support for incarcerated Black, Latino, Native American 
folks victimized by wealth extraction by appealing to white man’s con-
ception of himself as a taxpayer-citizen seems increasingly far-fetched.
III. Notes on a National Movement
Overall, the broad acceptance of the term “taxpayer money” as 
objective, reinforces the idea that money is generated by “taxpayers”, 
44. Angela Harris, Law and Neoliberalism in Keilee Fant v. City of Ferguson, Mis-
souri—Part II, L. and Pol. Econ. (May 9, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/05/09/
law-and-neoliberalism-in-keilee-fant-v-city-of-ferguson-missouri [https:// perma.
cc/4D2Z-8QLR].
45. See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality, 32–34 (St. Martin’s Press 
2019) (discussing the California taxpayer revolt and the rise of the “digital poor-
house”).
46. Id.
47. Walter Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500 Company, Atlantic, https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-500- company/390492 
[https://perma.cc/4NF4-9V2Z].
48. Harris, supra note 44; Walsh, supra note 10.
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and inherently, the idea that the state depends on the charity of people 
who pay more in taxes (or at least face higher marginal rates) in order 
to spend money on other people.  Repeating that the government should 
be responsible first and foremost to “taxpayers” suggests that we have 
“shares” in our government, which are keyed to our supposed contribu-
tions in revenue.  Moreover, the very essence of some pleas to taxpayer 
interests suggests that if only the social policy being criticized were “rev-
enue-neutral” or somehow more fair to the individual taxpayer, then it 
would somehow be more just.  This sort of thinking corporatizes our idea 
of government and supports very narrow, shallow visions of citizenship 
and of humanity.
The fount of money and monetary power is public law, not private 
markets.  It follows that the government’s administration of our econ-
omy should improve the general welfare, not “taxpayer welfare” more 
narrowly.  As Harris argues, any movement for economic justice must 
overcome the toxic trope of the “undeserving benefit recipient.”49  Such 
a victory is inseparable from deconstructing the politics of racial taxation 
at every angle.
The conventional wisdom around taxpayer identity has the po-
tential to prematurely stratify and divide a national movement against 
monetary sanctions.  Although the prospect of saving funds for taxpayers 
might theoretically entice conservatives to join the ranks, history suggests 
the focus on individual tax burdens may very well pollute the entire space.
Ideally, a powerful national movement against fines and fees would 
intuitively take the fight to the federal level and force the federal govern-
ment to play a stronger role in providing important services.  The very 
pressure to fund local law enforcement bodies, especially courts, with 
funds collected from constituents creates perverse incentives that dis-
tort the fair administration of justice.50  When criminal courts become 
responsible for their own financing, they may prioritize the imposition of 
significant fee and fine amounts and dedicate substantial staff to collect-
ing these sums.
And yet, if perverse incentives are the concern, shifting the fiscal 
burden back onto the very people who shucked it seems problematic. 
Advocates argue in good faith that “all the citizens should pay court ex-
penses out of the general fund.”  But this confuses the issues: citizens do 
not pay court expenses in any scenario.  Rather, taxpayers (who may or 
may not be citizens) pay into general coffers, which can then be used for 
court expenses or not.  Thus, if a county courthouse is funded by a general 
fund, the relevant question becomes whether that general fund is paid 
into equitably.  Conflating the collection and spending functions of a local 
government muddies the debate.
49. Angela Harris, Modern Money and Historical Trauma, L. and Pol. Econ. (Nov. 
9, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/09/modern-money-and- historical-trauma 
[https://perma.cc/662K-LF5D].
50. Brooke-Eisen & Menendez, supra note 5, at 6.
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Thankfully, many organizations and advocates have already iden-
tified the transformative potential of federal fiscal levels.  Some have 
highlighted how the federal grant process can be amended to help local 
institutions perform minimal law enforcement functions, but reduce 
reliance on fines and fees.51  Under the Obama Administration, the De-
partment of Justice offered five small “Price of Justice” grants to local 
governments in order to incentivize better practices.52  Although these 
sorts of initiatives may be narrow in their current ambitions, the fight for 
additional federal funding for good practices may contain the seeds a sys-
tem with a more just design—whereby institutional users of the currency 
do not force individual users of the currency to fit the bill for a criminal 
legal system that will invariably serve the interest of some currency users 
but not others.
Conclusion
If the aim of the movement against monetary sanctions is to truly 
provide broad-based funding of necessary law enforcement apparatus, 
then the claim should be set against the legal entity with the power of 
the public purse and thus the broadest funding base: The United States 
Congress.  The fiscal burden needs to be taken off the shoulders of those 
who now unfairly bear it.  But if the problem is not to repeat itself, or 
manifest in alternative oppressive form, the burden must also be taken 
off the shoulders of entities that face tight survival constraints.  If the aim 
of appealing to taxpayers to solve social problems is truly public solidar-
ity, then the claim for justice should be levied by the “public”, rather than 
the “taxpayer”, against the state itself.
51. Inimai Chettiar et al., Brennan Ctr. for Just., Reforming Funding to Re-
duce Mass Incarceration (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Report_Reforming-Funding-Reducee-Mass-Incarceration.pdf.
52. U.S Commission on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Communi-
ties of Color: Civil Rights and Constitutional Implications (2017), https://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf.
